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on june

25

1950

1

north korean armed forces invaded

the republic of korea that nation had been established
under the direction of the united nations and its government was recognized by the united nations and the united
states as the legal government for the whole of korea the
invasion was a violation of those provisions of the united
nations charter intended to prevent aggressive warfare some
action by the united nations was inevitable less than awen
twen
ty four hours after news of the invasion had been received
in response to a request by the united states the security
council adopted a resolution which branded the invasion as a
breach of the peace urged the immediate cessation of hostili ties and called on north korea to withdraw forthwith
tilities
their armed forces to the thirty eighth parallel the security
council called upon all members to render every assistance
to the united nations in the execution of this resolution and
to refrain from giving assistance to the north korean authori
ties 2
thorities
there is nothing in the resolution or in the security council s discussion of the resolution to indicate that anyone in
11

mr perkins is instructor in history at brigham young university
he invasion began at 400 AM june 25 korean time 200 PM june
the
24 washington time korea is fourteen hours ahead of the eastern time zone
first official news of the invasion was received in washington at 926 PM
june 24
new york times june 26 1950 the action was possible only because
russia was absent from this and subsequent security council meetings her

delegation was boycotting the council because the council refused to replace
the nationalist chinese delegate with a delegation from red china the legality
of the resolution was challenged by the russian delegate on the grounds that
according to the UN charter action could be taken in the council only by
an affirmative vote of seven members including the concurring votes of the perchapter V article 27 clause 33. since russia had not
manent members
participated she had not cast a concurring vote for the resolution but precedent had interpreted this clause as conferring a veto which was valid only if
actually exercised

25
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terpreted the resolution as a request to member nations to
supply military assistance to south korea nevertheless on
june 27 president truman authorized the use of american air
and naval forces to support south korean troops he also
ordered the united states seventh fleet into the formosan
strait to protect formosa from possible aggression by the
chinese communists in a public statement truman justified
his action

the

security council of the united nations called upon the
invading troops to cease hostilities and to withdraw to the
thirty eighth parallel this they have not done but on the
contrary have pressed the attack the security council called
upon all members of the united nations to render every
assistance to the united nations in the execution of this
resolution
in these circumstances 1I have ordered united states
air and sea forces to give the korean government troops
cover and support 3

almost simultaneously the united states was sponsoring
a second resolution in the security council calling on member
nations to furnish such assistance to the republic of korea
as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and restore
international peace and security in the area 4 truman s order
committing american air and naval forces to combat preceded
the adoption of this resolution by almost twelve hours the
jart
security council was faced with a jair
fart
fair
fait accompli this may
have influenced the council s decision to adopt the resolution
which simply legalized the action already taken by the united
states three days later truman ordered american ground
forces into action 5 america was at war no matter what the
fray might be called
the legality of truman s action is certainly open to question he had not consulted congress prior to ordering american forces into combat although in doing so he was plunging the nation into war it cannot seriously be maintained that
the president was exercising powers granted or even implied
by american participation in the united nations at the time
new york times june 28 1950
new york times june 28 1950
new york times july 1 1950
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he acted the security council had not asked for military support for south korea even after the security council authori zed the use of troops truman s action remained a violathorized
tion of the language if not the spirit or intent of the united
6
of
1945
act
regardless of the political
nations participation
or military justification for intervention truman s action was
clearly a violation of the constitution which designates congress as the war making agency of the american government
but this was only the most recent in a long series of encroach
ments on the war power of congress
the power to declare war under the constitution resides
with the congress subject only to the limitation that a declaration of war may be vetoed by the president the president
may prevent war unless two thirds of both houses of congress
override his veto but he may not declare war this grant of
power to the congress is consonant with the power given to
that body to provide the instruments of warfare the power
to raise and maintain an army and a navy and to call forth
the militia but other powers related to the war power are
granted to the president he is given the principal responsibility for the conduct of foreign affairs he may with the advice
619 621
united states statutes at large 79th congress ift
ist session LIX 619621
section 6 of the statute authorizes the president to negotiate special agreements
with the security council subject to approval by congress defining the numbers and types of troops to be made available to the security council on its
call for maintaining international peace and security under article 43 of the
united nations charter these agreements were never negotiated so that in
june 1950 the president lacked congressional authority to supply american
armed forces to the council but the act provided further the president shall
not be deemed to require the authorization of the congress to make available
to the security council on its call in order to take action under article 42 ie
for military action to maintain or restore international peace and security of
said charter the armed forces provided for under those agreements the language of the statute and the debate on the law in congress make it clear that it
was intended that the president should be free to make troops available to the
security council as needed without special approval by congress once the
troops had been provided for by such general agreement or agreements this
sentiment was expressed for example by senator robert taft who had been
expected to oppose giving the president that much leeway 1 I want to make it
clear said taft that I1 am wholly in favor of giving authority to the security
council to use armed force permitting its use without reference to congress
congressional record 79th congress ist session 10966 had the agreements
been negotiated and ratified as congress expected them to be truman s action
would have been authorized at least under the second resolution of the security
council the failure to negotiate agreements as had been intended lay with the
security council thus truman s action was contrary to the express provision
of the statute but in general accord with congressional intent

Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 1962

3

BYU Studies Quarterly, Vol. 4, Iss. 1 [1962], Art. 5

BRIGHAM YOUNG

28

university

STUDIES

and consent of the senate make treaties and appoint ambassadors and he may without limitation receive ambassadors
and other public ministers the president is also designated
commander in chief of the army and navy of the united
states and of the militia of the several states when called
into the service of the united states 7
the founding fathers intended that the president should
exercise the dominant power in the conduct of foreign affairs
and should command the armed forces provided by congress
but only congress should have the power to plunge the nation
into war this is supported by alexander hamilton in the
federalist distinguishing between the powers of the president and those of the british king hamilton makes this point
concerning the commander in chief power it would amount
to nothing more than the supreme command and direction of
the military and naval forces as first general and admiral of
the confederacy while that of the britishking
british king extends to the
declaring of war and to the raising and regulating of fleets
and armies all ofwhich
of which by the constitution under considera8
tion would appertain to the
legislature
tle
tie legisla
ture
on one of the rare oc
aich the supreme court
asiqns
occasions
asians on which
has considered the power to declare war it supported the view
that congress and not the president was to exercise primacy
in the war making power the issue before the court was
not a direct test of the power of the president to make war
in the ordinary sense of a conflict with a foreign nation but
in ruling on the right of the president to take action in the
case of rebellion the court declared
by the constitution congress alone has the power to
declare a national or foreign war
the constitution
confers on the president the whole executive power
he is commander i n chief of the army and navy of the
united states and of the militia of the several states when
called into actual service of the united states he has no
power to initiate or declare a war either against a foreign
nation or a domestic state
if a war be made by invasion of a foreign nation the
president is not only authorized but bound to resist force
article I1 sections

jacob
465
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by force he does not initiate the war but is bound to
accept the challenge without waiting for any special legis-

lative authority

9

thus the president

may not initiate or declare war but he may
commit the nation to war if that action is in response to actual
invasion such was the constitutional intent
in practice this has broken down since the president is
in a position to usurp the power of congress in this area As
the principal agent in the conduct of foreign affairs the executive can commit the nation to a course of action which may
virtually force congress to declare war the power to recognize or refuse to recognize nations to sever diplomatic relations to enforce or not enforce american claims and many
other similar powers are specifically within the realm of
presidential jurisdiction any of these may be by traditional
usage a cause of war further as commander in chief he has
the power if not the legal authority to order american armed
forces anywhere in the world in so doing he may actually
plunge the nation into war without a congressional declaration
even though such action would be unconstitutional this is the
interpretation which precedent has given the commander in

chief power rather than the limited power of first general
and admiral envisioned by hamilton william howard

taft

although he subscribed to a rather limited interpretation of the president s powers saw this clearly writing
between his terms as president and chief justice he said
president is commander in chief of the army and
navy and the militia when called into the service of the
united states under this he can order the army and navy
anywhere he will if the appropriations furnish the means
of transportation of course the instrumentality which this

the

prize cases 2 black 635 668 1863 italics supplied the dissenting opinion of four justices including chief justice taney is even more emphatic on this point declaring that only the congress may make war that even
when the president responds to actual invasion it is not a war until declared or
recognized by congress
but before this insurrection against the established
government can be dealt with on the footing of a civil war
it must be
recognized or declared by the war making power of the government no power
from that of
short of this can change the legal status of the government
peace to a state of war
there is no difference in this respect between a
civil or a public war
688 9 if this interpretation were accepted the korean
6889
conflict and other undeclared wars would not be wars and so there would be
no question of constitutionality involved but if not wars what are they

the
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power furnishes gives the president an opportunity to do
things quite beyond his power under the constitution directly
to effect under the constitution only congress has the
power to declare war but with the army and the navy the
president can take action such as to involve the country in
war and leave congress no option but to declare it or to
recognize its existence 10

ability of the president to commit the nation to war in
this fashion extends equally to cases of defense and aggression
though the latter would be unconstitutional should the
president order american forces to move aggressively against
another nation congress would be faced with a fait accompli
and would have no alternative consistent with national honor
but to acquiesce thus the president is well equipped to assume
the initiative in the war making power
the practice of one hundred and seventy years supports
taft s argument that while the power to declare war formally rests with the congress the president is capable of involving the nation in war leaving congress little choice but
to concur between the founding of the nation and our entry
into world war 1I the united states engaged in three formally declared wars two of these the war of 1812 and the
spanish american war were declared in accordance with the
constitutional formula in neither instance did the president
so embroil the nation as to commit or virtually commit the
nation to war in advance of congressional action in fact both
of those wars came as a result of congressional demand for
war on the other hand the mexican war was clearly the
result of presidential action which triggered a mexican response that left congress with little choice but to declare
war the joint resolution providing for the annexation of
texas had left the boundary between texas and mexico undefined asserting america s right to the rio grande as a
boundary polk ordered american troops under zachary taylor
to the rio grande on april 25 1846 more than a year after
the joint resolution for the annexation of texas had passed

the

william H taft our chief magistrate and his powers

new york

p 94 taft supported the constitutional theory of the presidency ie
II enumerates the powers of the executive and the president must
that article 11
justify all of his actions on the basis of a power enumerated there or a power
that may be clearly implied from an enumerated power
1916
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congress and five months after the formal admission of
texas but within a few days after taylor s arrival at the rio
grande a small scouting force was attacked by mexican patrols eleven americans were killed and five wounded in spite
of the fact that the skirmish occurred in disputed territory
polk urged congress to declare war charging mexico has
shed american blood upon the american soil congress
responded by declaring that a state of war exists between
that government mexico and the united states polk not
the congress had actually initiated the war 11
even more important than the three declared wars in the
executive usurpation of the war power were the undeclared
wars we engaged in prior to world war 1I these were the
french naval war the tripolitan and barbary expeditions
the philippine insurrection the china relief expedition
better known as the boxer war and the military campaigns
1I 12 generagainst mexico immediately preceding world war L
ally these were fought on executive authority without benefit
of a declaration of war with congress acquiescing only by making appropriations thus prior to involvement in world war 1I
the united states had engaged in three formal wars and six
additional conflicts which historians classify as wars of these
nine encounters only two were undertaken in accordance with
the constitutional formula 13
the erosion of congress war power was virtually comII it
pleted by american involvement in world wars 1I and 11
11

vay
1812 see francis F beirne the way
war of 1812 new
york 1949 pp
64 95 for the mexican war see jesse S reeves american
ap 6495
diplomacy under tyler and polk baltimore 1907 pp
ap 162
308 cf
189 288
162189
288308
war with mexico vol 1I new york 1919 pp
justin H smith the way
82 155
ap 82155
which places most of the responsibility for the war on mexico for the spanish
american war see french E chadwick the relations of the united states and
spain diplomacy new york 1909 pp
544 587 cf julius W pratt ameriap 544587
ca
ap 3954
cass colonial experiment new york 1950 pp
39 54
consult any of the standard histories of american foreign relations see
samuel F bemis A diplomatic history of the united states fourth edition
new york 1955 for the french naval and barbary wars A whitney griswold the far eastern policy of the united states new york 1938 for the
philippine and boxer wars arthur S link woodrow wilson and the progressive
gres sive era new york 1954 for the mexican campaigns
to this list might be added many other instances of presidential use of
troops or tentative commitment to the use of troops ranging from 1800
through the 1950s since most of these did not precipitate fighting and none of
them led to wars they may safely be excluded from this discussion
for the war of
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would distort the facts to say that the president singlehandedly led the nation into either of those wars but in both
cases presidential conduct of foreign affairs in the prewar
pre war
period created a situation where the question of war or peace
was virtually taken out of congress hands A principal cause
of world war 1I was wilson s stubborn insistence on american neutral rights in the face of german employment of the
submarine his reaction to german sin
sinkings
kings especially of
linkings
the lusitania and the sussex the doctrine of strict accountability and especially the issuance of the sussex note in
which he advised germany that he would sever diplomatic relations if she did not abandon unrestricted submarine warfare
committed the nation to a policy which left the congress little
choice but to declare war when germany did resume unrestricted
strict ed submarine warfare 14 our involvement in world war
11
II is even more to the point under roosevelt s leadership the
nation followed an unneutral course almost from the start
the lend lease program and the destroyers for bases deal
are evidence of our lack of real neutrality so far as europe
was concerned in the far east we responded to the japanese threat by cancelling our commercial treaty with japan
placing an embargo on the export of scrap metal and freezing
japanese credits more than a month before pearl harbor
the nation stood in a state of undeclared war 15
post war period brought new problems to further
the postwar
complicate the question both our military strategy and our
foreign relations became increasingly complex so that congress was forced to rely more and more on the judgment of
see link woodrow wilson pp
ap 145282
145 282 submarine warfare was not
of course the only factor involved the anglo american community of interest which had developed over a century of peaceful relations our role as
arsenal for the allies the arming of our merchantmen
merchant men the zimmerman note
merchantman
and other factors entered in but none of these alter the basic fact that war was
pretty much a foregone conclusion before wilson sent his war message to
congress
see william L langer and S everett gleason the challenge to isolaagain
tion new york 1952 and the undeclared war new york 1953
this is not an exhaustive list of the causes of the war the intent here is simply
to suggest the role of the president in committing the united states to a
course of action which led to war it should be noted that while some of the
actions lend lease for example involved congressional approval most were
executive acts which did not require congressional consultation neither roosevelt nor wilson however was really going contrary to the will of the nation
at large
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specialists in the executive department changes in military
technology revolutionized traditional concepts america could
no longer rely on her oceanic barriers for protection the increased responsibility of the united states in world affairs and
the revolution in technology raised the question
where is
our first line of defense most agreed that it was outside our
territorial boundaries in an address delivered in january
1950 for example secretary of state dean acheson tentatively drew our defensive perimeter in the pacific it included
japan and the philippines not american territory though not
korea or formosa he made it clear that the united states
would fight if an attack occurred inside the perimeter 16
finally our association with the united nations might create
situations where it would be difficult to employ the constitutional formula the question had been raised early as to
whether or not our delegation to the security council could
commit the armed forces of the united states to police action
under united nations sponsorship without specific congressional approval in his famed fireman analogy in 1944
roosevelt indicated that they must be able to do so that the
united nations would be completely ineffective if delegates
had to scurry off on each occasion to secure the approval of
their respective governments
the korean intervention underlined many of these problems the legality of truman s action is open to question but
there is general agreement that intervention was both wise
and necessary north korea s invasion of the republic of
korea created a crisis situation the communization of china
had been a serious set back for the free world which producLr
ed a growing
feeling of despair there was serious question
rowing
concerning both the willingness and the ability of the free
world under american leadership to halt the onward rush
of communism korea presented a challenge which could not
be avoided if the onrushing tide were to be halted general
douglas macarthur expressed this very well in a letter to the

house minority leader joseph W martin jr
it seems strangely difficult for some to realize that here
in asia is where the communist conspirators have elected

new york times january
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to make their play for global conquest and that we have
joined the issue thus raised on the battlefield that here we
fight europe s war with arms while the diplomats there still
fight it with words that if we lose the war to communism
in asia the fall of europe is inevitable win it and europe
most probably would avoid war and yet preserve freedom 17

was the symbolic importance of korea if the free world
were to effectively resist communism it must be made clear to
all concerned friend and foe alike that the free nations were
willing to fight to prevent further communist encroachment
in this sense it might well be argued that korea was our first
line of defense
but while forceful resistance was necessary was it also
necessary that action be taken without consulting congress
the answer to this question depends in part on the immediacy
of the threat and the time required for congressional response
bad acthere is little doubt that korea would have been lost had
tion been delayed even with american aid so promptly supplied the defenders of south korea were nearly swept into the
sea what the result of waiting for congressional action would
have been no one knows the decision to provide air and
naval support for south korea was made on june 27 less than
three days after fighting began since the invasion occurred
on a weekend it is doubtful that congress could have convened and taken action in this relatively brief period but
ground forces were not committed until june 30 just short
of six days after the invasion it is entirely possible that truman could have secured congressional approval of our intervention in that length of time in any event he certainly could
have sought ex post facto ratification of his actions
other factors complicated the matter one was the desire
to limit the action as much as possible there was reason to
fear that russia and perhaps red china might enter the war
if the united states intervened one means of lessening the
risk was to avoid the full commitment that would have been
implied in a congressional declaration of war or for that
matter congressional ratification of the war effort more important was the relationship between the united states and

this

mac
macarthur
arthur to martin march 20
congress ist session 3831
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the united nations truman was striving desperately to make
the action against north korea a united nations undertaking
rather than a unilateral enterprise by the united states he
was trying to foster the belief in the united states and in the
free world at large that this was a collective effort to restore
the peace under these circumstances a declaration of war by
the united states on north korea or for that matter congressional ratification of truman s action might well have destroyed the effectiveness of the united nations umbrella under
which the united states was operating
the constitutional problem is pointed up by truman s action if it were necessary or even wise for him to act without
congressional approval it would indicate that at times the
nation s interest would require the president to act without
consulting congress on the other hand it is obvious that in
most instances the nation will be better served if full congressional deliberation is given whenever possible to the
question of war or peace as the question arises the chinese
Pesca dores late in 1954 and
threat to invade formosa and the pescadores
early in 1955 prompted the formulation of a third alternative
eisenhower
eisen hower sought conto meet the existing threat president Elsen
gressional approval in advance for military action in that area
this was in reality a contingent declaration of war
in a message to congress on january 24 1955 the president reviewed the role of formosa and the pescadores
Pesca dores in the
american defense system in the pacific and the current
threat posed by communist china in that area 18 emphasizing
the seriousness of the situation and the need for immediate
action to offset the threat the president declared
clearly this existing and developing situation poses a
serious danger to the security of our country and of the
entire pacific area and indeed to the peace of the world
the situation has become sufficiently critical to
impel me without awaiting action by the united nations
to ask the congress to participate now by specific resolution in measures designed to improve the prospects for
peace these measures would contemplate the use of the
armed forces of the united states if necessary to assure
Pescadores
the security of formosa and the pescadores
house documents 84th congress ist session no 76 passim
rial relating to the presidents message is taken from this document
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president foresaw two possible situations requiring action 1 1 air and naval support might be needed in the redeployment and consolidation of chinese nationalist forces
and 2 we must be alert to any concentration or employment
of chinese communist forces obviously undertaken to facilitate
attack upon formosa and be prepared to take appropriate
military action the president was asking permission to engage in preventive war should that be necessary the geographical area involved was not clearly defined it included
Pesca dores and any portion of the surrounding
formosa the pescadores
safe guarding of formosa
area deemed necessary to the safeguarding
the president anticipated the argument that the authority
requested was already his and stated his reasons for seeking
congressional action

the

authority for some of the actions which might be required would be inherent in the authority of the commander
in chief until congress can act I1 would not hesitate so
far as my constitutional powers extend to take whatever
emergency action might be forced upon us in order to protect
the rights and security of the united states
however a suitable congressional resolution would
clearly and publicly establish the authority of the president
as commander in chief to employ the armed forces of the
nation promptly and effectively for the purposes indicated
if in his judgment it became necessary it would make clear
the unified and serious intentions of our government our
congress and our people

primary reason for consulting congress was for the
propaganda value the resolution would have not to satisfy
the requirements of the constitution the intent was to dramatize in unmistakable terms american opposition to further communist aggression
in response to the president s message identical resolutions were introduced in both houses of congress the resolutions took cognizance of the threat to formosa and the pes
cadoree
ca
cadores
dores and the importance of those islands to the vital interests of the united states and all friendly nations in or bordering upon the pacific and then resolved

the

I1

the president of the united states be and he hereby
is authorized to employ the armed forces of the united

that
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states as he deems necessary for the specific purpose of securPescadores against armed
ing and protecting formosa and the pescadores
attack this authority to include the securing and protection
of such related positions and territories of that area now in
friendly hands and the taking of such other measures as he
judges to be required or appropriate in assuring the defense
Pescadores
of formosa and the pescadores

resolution was to expire when the president determined
that the peace and security of the area is reasonably assured
and shall so report to the congress 19
the resolution which simply gave form to the president s
recommendations conferred broad powers on the president
in three areas first it is relatively indefinite regarding the
geographical area to be protected second the power to act
build up which
preventively in the face of a communist buildup
would threaten formosa is implied third the expiration of
the resolution is at the discretion of the president the vague
and sweeping nature of the resolution together with the cursory consideration given the proposal indicates clearly the
extent to which congress has abdicated andor the executive
has assumed the war making power
consideration was hurried and superficial in the house
the resolution was referred to the committee on foreign affairs and in the senate to the joint committee on foreign relations and armed services the committees met jointly on the
afternoon of january 24 and heard testimony from secretary
of state john foster dulles and the chairman of the joint
chiefs of staff arthur radford the hearings were secret
and have not been published but they were summarized by
the chairmen of the committees they emphasized the indispensability
pens ability of formosa and the gravity of the threat dulles
particularly stressed the need for a firm stand to hold formosa and to make it clear to the people of asia that the
united states was determined to halt communist advances
as more of a question of psythe resolution was described
chology than geography 20

the

11

w congressional

record 84th congress ist session 601
daily digest 84th congress ist session D 21 cf new york times
january 25 1955
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the house

committee was content in order to secure
early passage the committee reported the measure without
amendment and by unanimous vote the same afternoon
the senate committee moving more slowly heard testimony
from the joint chiefs of staff the following day and reported
the resolution on january 26th beating down two amendments both of which were again submitted on the floor the
senate committee reported the measure without amendment
21
2
by a vote of 27
272
the committee reports which are very similar gave special attention to four points the geographical area involved
the role of the united nations the opinions of the joint
chiefs of staff and the effect of the resolution on the relative powers of the president and congress the last with
which we are primarily concerned received only limited and
we may assume from the nature of the witnesses superficial
consideration the language of the house report embodies
the sense of the senate report as well

the

committee considered the relation of the authority
granted by the resolution and the powers assigned to the
president by the constitution its conclusion was that the
resolution in this form while making it clear that the people
of the united states stand behind the president does not
enter the field of controversy as to the respective limitations
of power of the executive and legislative branches

language elsewhere in the reports makes it clear that the
committees recognized that the resolution conferred on the
president the power to act offensively in the face of communist build
buildup
up as well as defensively in the case of armed
attack there was no question but that the resolution gave
the president carte blanche to commit the nation to war without further consulting congress in view of this the opinion
of the committees that the issue does not enter the field of
controversy as to the respective limitations of power of the
executive and legislative branches is a clear indication of
the extent to which the congress was willing to surrender its
war making power 22
senate reports 84th congress ist session no 13 passim
house reports 84th congress ist session no 4 4 senate reports
84th congress ist session no 13 7799
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39

the

measure
was considered by the committee of the whole house on the
state of the union under a closed rule which allowed only
two hours of debate and banned any except committee sponsored amendments the rule provided that the question was
to be voted on immediately after the committee rose without
intervening action and only one motion to recommit was to
be entertained 23 debate on the rule was limited to one hour
since the debate on the rule was really devoted to discussion
of the merits of the resolution the resolution received a total
of three hours of debate hardly adequate for a measure of
such importance not even all of that time was used
the surprising thing about the house debate is that not
one member objected to the resolution on the grounds that it
gave to the president the authority to decide if when and
within limits where war should begin action approving the
resolution said representative budge was in no sense abrogating to the executive the legislative power and the duty
under the constitution to declare war no one took issue with
this statement on the contrary a number of representatives
principally speaker rayburn and majority leader mccormack
expressed some criticism of the resolution on the grounds that
the president already possessed all the power as commander
in chief that the resolution conferred they were concerned
lest the president limit his power to act in future crises by
seeking congressional approval in this instance 24
the resolution passed the house by the overwhelming
majority of 410
41033 of the three who voted nay only one
did so because the resolution would permit the executive to
plunge the country into war without a formal declaration by
congress or without consulting congress further 25 only one
man of the 413 present and voting was alarmed at this far
reaching surrender of congressional power
house reports 84th congress ist session no 5 passim congressional
record 84th congress ist session 659
24
congressional record 84th congress ist session 659680
659 680 the budge
quote is at 661 the rayburn statement referred to is at 672 McCor
macks at
mccormacks
659

congressional record 84th congress ist session 680 new york times
january 26 1955
25
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consideration of the measure on the senate floor as in
the senate hearings proceeded at a more leisurely pace than
in the house debate broke out on january 26th when the
resolution was reported before it was called up for consideration and continued until january 28th debate was sharp
but the constitutional implication of the measure was not a
real issue As we have seen the report of the committee whitewashed the issue declaring that the resolution did not enter
the field of dispute concerning the limitations of the two
branches of government and this position was generally adhered to in the debate only senator morse criticized the
resolution because it transferred the war making power to
the president 1 I do not believe any president should have
that power he declared 1 I do not believe congress should
in any way delegate its power to declare war on the other
hand a number of senators took the position rayburn and
others had assumed in the house that the president already
possessed the necessary power to act without special congressional approval the paradoxical position of many senators who were supporting the resolution while maintaining
that congress had the war power is exemplified by senator
sparkman he recognized that if the president used our
armed forces in a formosan crisis it would probably precipitate
a major war at the same time he continued to maintain that
under the constitution only congress can authorize the
making of war by this government not one of the five
amendments which were offered expressed any reservation
concerning or any attempt to restrict the power of the president to plunge the nation into war the primary issue was
simply a question of geographical limitations the resolution
26
3
passed by a majority of 85
853
in the short space of five days with minimal consideration
and unchanged from the form in which it had been introduced 27 the resolution was passed granting the president
the authority to take actions which could precipitate a major
war considering the gravity of the threat and the need to
take preventive action there is no intent to suggest that the
11

congressional record 84th congress ist session 735769
813 852 920815
735 769 815852
813852
994 the morse quote is at 841 sparkman at 933
united states statutes at large 84th congress ist session LXIX 7
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resolution should not have been passed but the speed with
which it was adopted the lack of concern for the constitutional
issues involved in fact the insistence that the president already had all the powers included in the resolution indicate
the degree to which congress was unwilling to assume its
responsibility
the formosa resolution did adhere more closely to constitutional intent than truman s action in korea congress was
at least consulted but as a substitute for the constitutional formula it leaves much to be desired the executive department
was clearly at the helm the resolution originated in the
executive branch and the only witnesses heard by the congressional committees were members of the executive department further congress had only limited choice theoretically it would have been possible to defeat the resolution and
at least this was a more likely possibility than failure to
support a war already underway but that would have undermined the president and compromised the united states in
world affairs the alternatives did not really admit a free
choice

even the formosa formula
a contingent declaration of
war might not always be possible two limitations govern
its use first the government must be able to foresee the
threat second the threat must be remote enough to make
congressional consultation possible both conditions were
present in the formosa situation future threats to the peace
may arise without providing time to consult congress
there are then three alternatives available with which
we may respond to a threat of war the most secure because
it provides the most adequate safeguards is the constitutional
formula it should be used wherever possible in considering
the question of war or peace but it has definite problems and
serious limitations as we have seen if the formosan resolution
is an accurate measure of congressional intent it is obvious that
one of the most important of these limitations is the inability
or the unwillingness of congress to accept the responsibility
involved there may be times when the constitutional formula
simply cannot be used but those instances must not be multi
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plied by congress unwillingness to assume the responsibility
which under the constitution clearly resides with that body
in some cases the contingent declaration of war may have
to replace the constitutional formula at least it gives congress a role in the decision making process it has value as a
propaganda device making our position clear to friend and
foe alike and it commits the people through their representatives
ta tives to the action and so may lessen criticism at home
but it has definite limitations most important unless congress seriously assumes its responsibility and carefully considers the proposal it is little better than not consulting
congress at all
finally there may be instances when neither of the foregoing is possible when either military necessity or strategic
considerations make congressional consultation impossible or
unwise in these instances the korean approach would seem
to be the only alternative but neither congress nor the
president should permit this approach which is the simplest
to use to displace the constitutional formula simply because
it is more convenient the president must exercise great care
to avoid further usurpation of congressional power even
more important the congress must willingly accept its responsibility under the constitution only in that fashion can
the nation be adequately protected from involvement in a
war contrary to the nation s interest
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